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isclosure is costly. Is it worth the cost? The paper by 
Ursel Baumann and Erlend Nier provides an excellent 
beginning to examining the potential value of disclosure by 
focusing on the effect of disclosure on the volatility of stock 
returns. The paper employs a promising database of nearly 600 
banks in thirty-one countries. The central finding of the paper 
is that more disclosure tends to reduce volatility. The effect is 
highly significant statistically, even after having controlled for 
other determinants of bank risk using a standard list of control 
variables. 
But is the effect of disclosure on volatility of returns 
economically important? That is the most important question 
to ask when performing a cost-benefit analysis of disclosure, 
but it is not a question addressed directly in this paper. Indeed, 
the authors do not give us much information on the estimated 
importance of the effect. For example, we do not know what 
the adjusted R2 of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
is with the disclosure variables included (the results reported in 
Table 4), and so we cannot see how much explanatory power is 
gained by adding the disclosure variables.
We can glean some evidence on the importance of the 
coefficients in Table 4 by using the fact that the within-country 
standard deviation of the disclosure index is 0.17. Table 4 holds 
country effects constant, which implies that one can interpret 
the coefficient in Table 4 as indicating that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the disclosure index results in a volatility 
reduction of (0.17) × (0.0096), which is roughly equal to 0.002. 
Since the mean of volatility is 0.05 and its standard deviation 
is 0.03, that effect does not strike me as very economically 
important. I conclude that banks’ choices about disclosure 
do not seem to materially affect volatility.
Of course, that does not mean that disclosure is 
unimportant. The results in Table 4 and the calculation 
performed in the previous paragraph control for the level of 
disclosure within the country. Table 4 only calculates the effects 
of a bank’s disclosing more than the average bank in its 
country. Table 4’s coefficients can be interpreted as measuring 
the effect of unusual voluntary disclosure on volatility, after 
controlling for the effects of mandatory disclosure and other 
voluntary standard practices within the country. The country 
averages differ markedly from one another (from a high of 0.73 
to a low of 0.28, as shown in Table A2). Those country averages 
probably largely reflect differences in regulatory requirements. 
Note, however, that if that interpretation is correct, then 
these results have nothing to say about the value of mandatory 
disclosure, since country dummy variables effectively control 
for mandatory disclosure. It is true that much of the variation 
in bank disclosure is voluntary (the within-country standard 
deviation of 0.17 is larger than the across-country standard 
deviation of 0.12), but that does not mean that the variation in 
the index produced by voluntary disclosure is more important 
than the variation produced by mandatory disclosure. Unusual 
voluntary disclosure is unlikely to be about data that are as 
important as those items typically covered by mandatory 
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disclosure. After all, mandatory disclosure’s intention is to 
identify precisely those measures that are the most important. 
Thus, I think it would be interesting to report the results 
without country dummy variables, but with a country-level 
measure of the average degree of disclosure in the country. 
It is possible that the size of the coefficient for that variable 
in the volatility regression could dwarf the effect measured 
in Table 4. I recognize that there are other econometric 
pitfalls associated with removing country controls, but I still 
think that this would be a worthwhile exercise.
I would also want to include an interaction term in the 
regression for the within-country disclosure choice and the 
country-level measure of average disclosure. I would expect 
that banks operating in an environment with little mandatory 
disclosure probably would benefit more from a little more 
voluntary disclosure than banks operating in environments of 
high mandatory disclosure. The reason is that low country-
level disclosure implies more opportunity for meaningful 
unusual voluntary disclosure.
If one failed to find a greater negative coefficient on the 
country-level disclosure variable than on the unusual voluntary 
disclosure variable, and if one failed to find any effect from the 
interaction term, those results would also be interesting. They 
would suggest that the items mandated for disclosure by 
regulators are not unusually important disclosures.
The effects described above might also depend in interesting 
ways on the specific disclosures that are mandated in a country. 
Here it may be useful to distinguish between types of disclosure 
that are very commonly mandated (observed to be part of the 
average country effect in many countries) and those that are 
not. For example, imagine that country X is the only country in 
the world not to mandate disclosure of item A. In contrast, 
item B is mandated by roughly half of the countries and not by 
the other half. Because the frequency with which an item is 
mandated may indicate its importance, it may be that the 
unusual voluntary choice of a bank operating in country X to 
disclose item A would have a larger effect than the unusual 
voluntary choice to disclose item B by a bank operating in a 
country that does not mandate disclosure of item B.
In summary, the paper by Baumann and Nier marks an 
excellent beginning to examining the effects of bank disclosure 
on equity volatility. My main comment is that future empirical 
research should attempt to distinguish mandatory from 
voluntary disclosure, measure the relative importance of the 
two kinds of disclosure for reducing equity volatility, and 
consider whether some forms of mandatory disclosure are 
more important than others. Doing so will help us to judge the 
extent to which current mandatory disclosures are worth their 
costs.
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